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ABSTRACT:  The paper provides an analysis of the general inflation targeting 
framework and its implications on macroeconomic performance improvement. Usually, the 
strategies are similar across countries, but specific conditions related to financial system 
stability, bank independence, transparency or credibility may differ from country to country, 
despite their level of development. It also examines whether certain conditions have to be met 
before emerging countries pass to this regime of monetary policy and brings different evidence 
to these requirements. We then examine some of industrialized and emerging economies that 
have been assessed to prove to what extent the inflation targeting decision contributed to a 
successful functioning market economy. 
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1. THE SHIFT TOWARDS INFLATION TARGETING  
 
  The primary role of the monetary policy is, undoubtedly, to maintain price 
stability, defined as a general economic state when agents no longer take into 
consideration a possible change in the general price level in their decision making, due 
to an annual rate of inflation in a low, single digits. Inflation targeting represents a 
strategy of monetary policy that requires the central bank to establish a target for the 
rate of inflation for a certain period of time and to achieve it using monetary 
instruments, so that price stability is obtained. In contrast to alternative strategies, like 
exchange rate targeting or money aggregates targeting, which use intermediate 
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variables to obtain a stable inflation, this strategy targets inflation directly. Both money 
aggregates and exchange rate targeting have been abandoned by a large number of 
central banks because of their limited control of the targets.  Money aggregates 
targeting is difficult to be applied because money are hard to control due to different 
shifts in demand or in money multiplier that influence the money supply and the 
relationship between money and inflation in the long run. The exchange rate is 
influenced by the international demand and supply of the domestic currency. A 
psychological factor or a change in demand of domestic currency induced by panic or 
by shifts in the international environment is hardly to be limited by a central bank. 
Inflation targeting was firstly adopted by both industrialized countries (New Zealand, 
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom) and a growing number of emerging countries 
(Chile, Korea or South Africa) that sought to lower the level of price volatility using 
different instruments of monetary policy since the early 1990s (see the table below). 
 
Table 1. Emerging and Industrial Countries that Target Inflation 
 
Country  Inflation Targeting 
Adoption Date  Inflation Rate  Inflation Target 
Emergent countries 
Chile   1990  26.6  HIPC 
Israel   1992  18.0  HIPC 
Czech Republic  1998  13.1  HIPC 
Poland   1999  9.9  HIPC 
Brazil 1999  3.3  HIPC 
Colombia 1999  9.3  HIPC 
South Africa   2000  2.3  HIPC 
Thailand 2000  1.7  HIPC 
Korea   2001  3.2  HIPC 
Mexico 2001  8.1  HIPC 
Hungary 2001  10.5  HIPC 
Peru   2002  -0.8  HIPC 
Philippines   2002  3.8  HIPC 
Slovakia 2005  3.2  HIPC 
Indonesia   2005  7.8  HIPC 
Romania 2005  8.8  HIPC 
Turkey   2006  7.7  HIPC 
Developed Countries 
New Zealand   1990  7.0  HIPC 
Canada   1991  6.2  HIPC 
United Kingdom   1992  3.6  HIPC 
Sweden   1993  4.8  HIPC 
Australia 1993  1.9  HIPC 
Iceland 2001  3.9  HIPC 
Norway   2001  3.7  HIPC 
Source: International Monetary Fund 
 
Specialists of the field sustain the idea of an entire typology of direct inflation 
strategy. Firstly, we can mention the complete strategies, adopted by countries where 
the central banks rely on a high level of credibility from the society, they take  
 
 
 
 
          Inflation Targeting - Between Theory and Reality                  359 
 
transparent measures of monetary policy and they have their own models of prognosis 
that include qualitative and quantitative assessments of banks’ activities. For all these 
countries (New Zealand, United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Poland) the operational 
goal consists of the short term interest rates because they have well developed financial 
markets. Secondly, we meet in practice eclectic strategies in countries where the 
confidence in central banks is so high that price stability can be maintained without 
defining explicit, intermediate goals, the level of transparency and responsibility being 
also quite high. Thirdly, there are incomplete strategies adopted by countries that are 
confronting with internal and external shocks, financial instability, a high level of 
dollarization and of trade volatility. In these countries, both the monetary aggregates 
and the interest rates become operational goals for the monetary policy. 
A short analysis, in the literature, regarding the best level of inflation to be 
achieved, reveals two opposite positions concerning this problem. Some economists 
such as Feldstein (1997) argue for a long-run inflation goal of zero, while others, such 
as Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996), argue that setting inflation at a too low level 
produces inefficiency and will determine an increase of the natural rate of 
unemployment. The Akerlof, Dickens and Perry argument is, however, highly 
controversial,  and a possible stronger argument against setting the long-run inflation 
target at zero is that a target of zero would make deflations more likely and deflations 
can lead to financial instability and sharp economic contractions (Mishkin, 2001). 
The use of this strategy has determined both pros and cons based on several 
reasons. Sustainers of inflation targeting argue that it encompasses a number of 
benefits compared to other strategies: 
• Inflation targeting involves a lower economic cost. The costs of policy failure 
can be very large, involving massive reserve losses, high inflation, financial and 
banking crises. On the other hand, the costs of failing to meet the inflation target are 
limited to a temporarily higher inflation than targeted and a temporarily slower rate of 
growth, due to higher interest rates meant to bring inflation back to target. 
• Inflation targeting can improve credibility and helps creating clear inflation 
expectations rapidly. A low inflation level is, undoubtedly, the primary goal of 
monetary policy and it requires greater transparency to compensate the operational 
freedom that it offers. Inflation targeting can help economic agents better understand 
and evaluate the performance of the central bank being easily observable and 
understandable than other targets. 
•  Inflation targeting provides more flexibility. The target on inflation is 
considered a medium-term objective because it cannot be achieved over night. This 
means that central banks try to control the target over a certain period, already 
presented to the public, accepting short term deviations without affecting its credibility.  
On the other hand, critics of inflation targeting have revealed seven important 
disadvantages of this monetary policy strategy. Mishkin (1999) and Bernanke et al. 
(1999) underline four of these disadvantages:  its rigidity as a strategy, it allows too 
much discretion, it may increase output instability and it lowers economic growth, but 
specialists consider them in reality not serious objections to a properly designed 
strategy which is best characterized as constrained discretion. The other three 
disadvantages are definitely very consistent. For example, in emerging market  
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countries inflation targeting can produce weak central bank responsibility due to its 
hard to control character and to existing long lags from the monetary policy 
instruments to the inflation outcome.  Also, the fact that inflation targeting cannot 
prevent fiscal dominance, and that the exchange rate flexibility required by inflation 
targeting might cause financial instability, are relevant in this context. 
 
2. PRECONDITIONS TO BE MET  
 
Inflation targeting cannot function in countries that do not meet a stringent set 
of preconditions, reason why the framework is considered unsuitable for a large 
spectrum of emerging market economies. Preconditions are often considered imminent, 
including here a spectrum of elements such as:  the technical ability of the central bank 
to implement inflation targeting, the absence of fiscal dominance, a developed 
financial market and an efficient institutional effort to support and motivate the 
commitment to low inflation (Batini and Laxton, 2006). 
 
Table 2. Main Conditions for Direct Inflation Targeting Regime 
 
Institutional Framework 
Price stability 
option  
It means that the central bank should receive a clear mandate that makes this 
objective fundamental for the bank activity compared to other objectives like 
economic growth, external competitiveness and employment.   
Independence of 
central bank  
The central bank needs to have the freedom to choose its own instruments  
The harmonization 
of monetary policy 
with fiscal policy 
The independence of the central bank can be constrained by a dominating 
fiscal policy that distortions the efficiency of monetary policy measures.  
The financial 
system  
A developed financial system reduces the effects of fiscal domination 
because it enlarges the Government’s possibility to borrow money from the 
internal market and to avoid seigniorage and other forms of fiscal 
domination.  
The  exchange  rate    A flexible exchange rate it is required due to the so-called “triangle of 
incompatibilities”.  
Technical Framework  
Target 
announcement  
The announcement of the inflation target should be made by both Central 
Bank and the Government, excepting the case where the central bank has an 
explicit mandate for price stability as a fundamental goal. 
Time horizon   One/ several years  
Price Index   Consuming Price Index for the majority of developing countries and core 
index for developed countries  
Target  The central banks do prefer an interval  target given the macroeconomic 
uncertainty  
Monetary 
instruments  
The monetary policy uses normal instruments  
Responsibility and 
transparency  
The central bank must offer press releases regarding the monetary policy 
decisions and periodical reports on inflation , it must have open, active 
dialogues with the community and even publish prognosis models.  
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The technical infrastructure includes the central bank’s ability to forecast the 
evolution of inflation based on different models of prognosis, but, also, to hold the data 
needed to implement them. The fiscal dominance is quantified using many criteria, 
such as: money lending by the central bank to the government, the level of seigniorage 
incomes in the GDP (a level higher than 2% indicates a fiscal domination) or the lack 
of involvement of central banks during a period of economic shocks.  
A healthy financial system, that is a stable banking system and a developed 
capital market can contribute to an effective monetary policy transmission that reduces 
the rate of potential shocks and increases the chance to implement healthy economic 
decisions. According to Sterne (2000), the choice of this type of strategy requires five 
important conditions: an analysis of the monetary policy history of the country, of the 
current level of inflation, of political and economic conditions and of the monetary 
strategy of similar countries.  
Trying to stress the prerequisites of this monetary policy strategy, we must 
underline that it encompasses both technical and operational elements (see the table 
below) and the most important are: the public announcement of medium-term 
numerical targets for inflation, an institutional commitment to price stability as main 
goal of the central bank, the freedom of choice in setting of policy instruments, an 
increased transparency through communication with the public and the markets, an 
increased credibility of the central bank for attaining its inflation objectives.  
An analysis, using econometric tools, used to reveal the real level of 
accomplishment of initial conditions before the adoption of inflation targeting, shows 
that most of the targeters had poor initial condition (see the graphs below).  
 
 
Source: IMF staff calculation 
Note: For each of the four categories of initial conditions, 0 = poor and 1 = ideal. 
 
Figure 1. Initial Conditions Prior to Inflation Targeting - Emerging Countries   
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Source: IMF staff calculation 
Note: For each of the four categories of initial conditions, 0 = poor and 1 = ideal. 
 
Figure 2. Initial Conditions Prior to Inflation Targeting - Industrial Countries  
 
  The graphs show us that none of the analyzed countries met individually all 
preconditions already discussed, but this should not be considered an impediment to 
the adoption and success of inflation targeting. The gap between emerging countries 
and industrial countries is insignificant, in terms of institutional, technical and 
economic features, which means that the strategy can bring benefits to both categories 
of economies and eliminates the idea that emergent markets are too fragile to 
successfully implement a strategy based on inflation targeting. On the other hand, we 
cannot extend this conclusion to all countries that may have weaker initial conditions. 
 
3. INFLATION TARGETING: AN EVALUATION OF RESULTS  
 
Empirical studies on inflation targeting, based primarily on industrialized 
countries having adopted this strategy in the early 1990s, associate it with performance 
improvements, though no statistical relation could be found. The lack of evidence is, 
partially determined by the reduced number of industrialized countries to report to, the 
macroeconomic environment favorable to development and the low level of inflation 
of the analyzed countries in the early 1990s.  On the other hand, no study has proved 
performance has deteriorated under inflation targeting.   
An comparative pre-adoption and post-adoption analysis made over the 
evolution of these conditions show us an improvement in terms of technical 
infrastructure, financial system health, institutional independence or economic 
structure.  
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Table 3. Preconditions and Current Conditions in Emerging Market and Industrial 
Countries (1=Current Best Practice) 
 
  Emerging countries  Industrial countries 
 Pre-adoption  Current  Pre-
adoption 
Current 
Technical Infrastructure  0.29  0.97  0.74  0.98 
Data availability  0.63  0.92  0.84  0.94 
Systematic forecast process  0.10  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Models capable of conditional forecast  
 
0.13 1.00  0.38  1.00 
Financial system health   0.41  0.48  0.53  0.60 
Bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted 
assets  
0.75 1.00  0.75  1.00 
Stock market capitalization to GDP   0.16  0.21  0.28  0.44 
Private bond market capitalization to GDP  0.10  0.07  0.40  0.31 
Currency mismatch  0.92  0.96  1.00  1.00 
Maturity of bonds  
 
0.23 0.43  0.46  0.52 
Institutional independence   0.59  0.72  0.56  0.78 
Fiscal obligation  0.77  1.00  0.75  1.00 
Operational independence   0.81  0.96  0.63  1.00 
Central bank legal mandate   0.50  0.62  0.16  0.44 
Governor’s job security   0.85  0.85  1.00  1.00 
Fiscal balance in percent of GDP   0.48  0.47  0.45  0.78 
Public debt in percent of GDP  0.47  0.47  0.53  0.54 
Central bank independence  
 
0.26 0.64  0.44  0.72 
Economic structure   0.36  0.46  0.47  0.55 
Exchange rate pass-through   0.23  0.44  0.31  0.50 
Sensitivity to commodity prices   0.35  0.42  0.44  0.56 
Extent of dollarization   0.69  0.75  1.00  1.00 
Trade openness  0.18  0.21  0.13  0.16 
Source: Batini, Kuttner and Laxton (2005)  
 
The above mentioned study reveals that any of the countries taken into 
consideration met partially the conditions for inflation targeting adoption, but 
industrialized countries behaved better than emerging countries. On the other hand, a 
visible performance between pre and post adoption could be explained through shifts in 
institutional and technical structures. Also, in terms of institutional, technical, but also 
economic features, the gap between targeters and non-targeters is almost insignificant, 
which makes us consider that any of the above factors could not represent an obstacle 
for a successful adoption of inflation targeting.  
All differences perceived between the two groups of countries rely on five 
fundamental institutional differences for emerging market countries (Mishkin, 2004) 
that must be taken into consideration into monetary policy projections: weak fiscal 
institutions, weak financial institutions including government prudential regulation and 
supervision, low credibility of monetary institutions, dollarization, and vulnerability to 
sudden stops of capital inflows. Definitely, advanced countries are not immune to  
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problems with their fiscal, financial and monetary institutions, but there is a major 
difference because weak fiscal, financial and monetary institutions make emerging 
market countries very vulnerable to high inflation and currency crises, so that the real 
value of money cannot be taken for granted.  
In conclusion, we dare to say that the feasibility and success of inflation 
targeting is rather dependent on the authorities’ commitment and ability to plan and 
drive institutional change after introducing inflation targeting, so that central banks 
should focus on the operational and technical goals in order to maximize all potential 
benefits. 
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